An Enquiry Concerning Humean Understanding: A Criticism of Hume’s Conception of Causal Events by Graham, Joshua
Graham 1 
 
 
Joshua Graham 
PHL 321K 
Dr. Leon 
25 Oct. 2017 
An Enquiry Concerning Humean Understanding: 
A Criticism of Hume’s Conception of Causal Events 
In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume provides an empirical account 
of knowledge that hinges upon the Copy Principle. The Copy Principle states that for every idea 
there is a corresponding impression or set of impressions that gives rise to the idea itself or its 
component ideas. With this foundation, Hume criticizes the idea that we have access to causation 
as the necessary connection between cause and effect. Considering the collision of two billiard 
balls, Hume identifies no sensory impression from which we copy our notion of causation. 
Therefore, he concludes that we perceive nothing in the collision that necessitates the outcome, 
as it is “consistent and conceivable” that they remain still or “a hundred different events might as 
well follow from [the collision]” (Hume, 172). Hume thinks this demonstrates that the cause and 
effect are distinct events, at least in our experience of them, and the necessary connection 
between the two remains a mystery. Additionally, he asserts that the negation of any matter of 
fact is just as possible as its affirmation. To say otherwise, Hume argues, would suggest that the 
claim “that the sun will not rise tomorrow…would imply a contradiction, and could never be 
distinctly conceived by the mind” (Hume, 170). Therefore, Hume affirms the conceivability of 
causes without their ordinary effects and the Conceivability Implies Possibility (CIP) principle. 
This implies the possibility of causes producing various effects and breaks the necessary 
connection between the two. Therefore, contrary to what Hume believes, his view does not buy 
us mere skepticism concerning causation but rather outright denial. To avoid this undesirable 
consequence, I can either undermine the CIP principle or the notion that Hume properly 
conceives of causation. However, the contrapositive of the CIP principle seems nearly 
unassailable. Therefore, in this paper I seek to demonstrate that Hume cannot be certain that he is 
properly conceiving of the cause and effect, whether he conceives of them imaginatively or 
propositionally, such that the CIP principle is not satisfied. 
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To my knowledge, Hume allows for two modes of ideas: imaginative ideas and 
propositional ideas. Imaginative ideas, such as visualizations, are merely representations of their 
corresponding objects. For example, an imaginative idea of a stop sign involves our idea of red 
confined to the shape of an octagon with the white, boxy letters that spell “STOP.” In this way, 
our mental image of stop sign resembles the actual stop sign because it is a composite of our 
ideas of red and white that the actual stop sign inspires in us. Therefore, we should think of 
imaginative ideas as amalgamations of our ideas of sensory perceptions that we interpret to 
represent something. In contrast, the propositional idea of a stop sign would be given in sentence 
form, such as “A stop sign is a metallic octagonal traffic sign that is largely red but has white, 
boxy letters that spell ‘STOP.’” While the truth value of this proposition is true, if the stop sign 
were not to exist or if it had different properties than the proposition purports it to have, then the 
proposition would be false. Propositions, unlike mental images, have truth values that tie them to 
their referents more directly. For example, I can have a mental image without there being an 
object that the image resembles, and objects can exist without us having mental images of them. 
However, the proposition "Tables exist" cannot be true unless there are indeed tables, and the 
same proposition cannot be false unless tables, in fact, do not exist.  
 
If Hume conceives of the causal and effectual events as imaginative ideas, then the CIP 
principle will not speak to the events themselves but only their representations. Since 
imaginative ideas are composites of several of our ideas of sensory perceptions, we can think of 
two forms of the CIP principle for imaginative ideas. The first principle states that a 
representation’s conceivability implies the representation’s possibility, and the second states that 
if a representation is conceivable, then the representation’s object is possible. While I take the 
first principle to be valid, I doubt the second and Hume requires this stronger principle in order 
to demonstrate that negations of matters of fact are possible. For example, when conducting 
proofs I could use the symbol ⊥ to represent a contradiction, but contradictions are not possible. 
So it seems that it is possible for one to conceive of a representation for an impossibility, and this 
counterexample would break the strong CIP principle for imaginative ideas. However, one might 
argue this is not a true counterexample, as the symbol ⊥ does not resemble a contradiction 
whereas the mental image of a billiard ball resembles a billiard balls, at least in some respects. I 
will accept that resemblance entails possibility, but this misunderstands how we assess 
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resemblance claims. If you told me that a cloud resembled a rabbit, to assess your claim I would 
have to view the cloud and compare my imaginative idea of the cloud with my imaginative ideas 
of rabbits. For this to be possible, the cloud must exist. Since all actually existing things are 
possible, for me to assess whether one thing resembles another, both have to be possible. 
Therefore, the only CIP principle that properly applies to imaginative ideas does demonstrate the 
possibility of the kinds of events that Hume requires to be possible for him to demonstrate that 
the causal and effectual events are distinct.  
 
Furthermore, in the case of Hume’s billiard balls, his imagination of the collision does 
not resemble causation. For Hume to properly conceive of the causal and effectual events as 
imaginative ideas at least some part of the idea must resemble causation; however, on both my 
view and Hume’s such a resemblance is impossible for imaginative ideas. Consider Hume’s 
example of the colliding billiard balls clearly represents a case of causation extended through 
time, so a static imaginative idea cannot resemble causation in the case of the billiard ball 
collision. If he conceives of the balls via imaginative ideas, then I take him to be thinking of a 
sequence of mental images of balls on a pool table. As Hume runs through the sequence, one ball 
translates across his mental field of view until arriving at a location adjacent to the second 
billiard ball. Then, Hume runs through another sequence of images of the second billiard ball 
moving in whatever direction he wants. In this way, he conceives of causes with effects other 
than those we observe them to have. However, notice the natural analogy between the 
imaginative conception of the billiard ball collision and a film depicting the same event on a 
digital screen. Films also resemble the events they represent via a sequence of discrete frames; 
however, a sequence of frames does not resemble causation. To say otherwise would suggest that 
contiguity resembles causation. However, suppose that I obtain two pictures of the same room, 
one with tables and chairs and one without, and then I run the two images through a projector. I 
have not conceived of objects coming from nothing or going into nothing, as I am not privy to 
the intermediate events between the two images2 (Pruss, 47 – 50). Thus, contiguity in 
representation does not resemble causality in objects, so it seems that sequences of imaginative 
ideas do not resemble causality either. Since neither singular imaginative ideas nor sequences of 
such ideas can resemble causation, Hume does not properly conceive of the colliding of the 
billiard balls if he conceives of them as imaginative ideas. 
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Hume’s position fares no better if we use of a propositional version of the CIP principle. I 
take the propositional CIP principle to state that if a proposition is possibly true then the 
proposition’s referents are possible. For example, if the statement “God exists” is possibly true, 
then God possibly exists. Hence, if Hume affirms the proposition concerning the occurrence of 
the cause but denies the proposition regarding the occurrence of the effect, then he commits 
himself to the existence of a possible world in which the billiard balls collide but the balls 
behave differently than they actually do. This denies altogether the necessary connection of 
causation and precludes Hume from restricting his critique to just human understanding of 
causation rather than causation itself as he intended. Indeed, Hume refrains from arguing against 
causation as the necessary connection between events, stating “a man is guilty of unpardonable 
arrogance who concludes, because an argument has escaped his own investigation, that therefore 
it does not really exist” (Hume, 176). However, the application of the propositional CIP to the 
collision overlooks the fact that the structure of the billiard balls might necessitate the effect in 
the cases of ideal collisions. Perhaps, the nature of matter necessitates the physical laws, and, 
therefore, it is not the case that there is a possible world in which these particular billiard balls 
collide and behave other than they actually do. Consequently, so long as it is possible that an 
object’s properties necessitate its behavior, then Hume is not justified in claiming that the effect 
is not necessitated by the cause. 
 
At this point, one could claim that my criticism of Hume entails what we might call 
epistemic fatalism, in which the only possible world we are aware of is the actual world. For 
example, suppose that I claim that it is possible that George Washington crossed the Delaware on 
Christmas Eve as opposed to Christmas Day. One could argue that such an assertion of 
possibility assumes that matter is not constructed in such a way that every event in history was 
necessitated by every prior event and that humans do not have free will. Therefore, the objector 
would say, we are not justified in claiming that it is possible that Washington crossed the 
Delaware a day earlier. Since this objection could apply to virtually any matter of fact, if we 
accept my objection to Hume's use of the propositional form of CIP as valid, then we are not 
justified in asserting any possibility beyond those that are demonstrated in this possible world. 
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While this line of reasoning does not directly attack the truth of my criticism, many might reject 
my view given the plausibility of knowledge of other possible worlds.  
 
While it might be impossible that the billiard balls behave differently than they actually 
do, it is possible that ball-like objects behave differently than balls actually do. Suppose that 
balls in our universe are made of matter that necessitates that balls behave as we observe them to 
behave after collisions. This does not preclude the possibility that in some other possible world 
balls are made of a differently structured matter or a different substance altogether such that balls 
necessarily leap vertically from tables upon collision. Likewise, it might be that George 
Washington could not have crossed the Delaware a day earlier than he did, but perhaps 
Washington-like persons could have in other possible worlds. Therefore, my objection to 
Hume’s use of the CIP would not prevent us from making claims about other possible worlds, 
but it might preclude us from affirming that any particular object in the actual world could take 
on properties other than those that they actually possess. 
 
In conclusion, this paper casts doubt on the idea that Hume conceives of the billiard balls 
correctly such that he can employ the CIP principle either in its imaginative or propositional 
form. I have called into question whether the CIP principle implies that the object of a 
representation is possible if the object’s representation is possible to conceive. Further, I have 
argued that an imaginative idea of the collision of billiard balls does not adequately resemble a 
causal event and, therefore, adding resemblance into the formulation of the stronger version of 
the imaginative CIP does not demonstrate the possibility of the billiard balls behaving 
differently. Finally, I attacked an application of a propositional form of the CIP and defended my 
criticism from possible charges that it entails that the only possible world that we know of is the 
actual world. Hume’s affirmation of the CIP principle and his assertion that he can conceive of 
causes with various effects attacks not only our perception of the necessary connection of cause 
and effect but the existence of such a connection. By undermining our confidence in Hume’s 
proper conception of causal events, we can rationally avoid accepting the conclusion that causes 
do not necessitate their effects. 
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